

ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK

Understanding the threat to your IIS servers

ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch™ threat hunting team has uncovered a new and highly sophisticated Internet Information Services (IIS) post-exploitation framework that CrowdStrike refers to as IceApple. OverWatch's observations, explored in detail in this paper, suggest that IceApple has been developed by an adversary with detailed knowledge of the inner workings of IIS.

Since OverWatch's discovery of IceApple in late 2021, the framework has been observed in multiple victim environments and in geographically distinct locations, with intrusions spanning the technology, academic and government sectors. OverWatch's investigations have identified at least 18 modules, each adding capabilities to the IceApple framework. OverWatch's observations suggest that this framework is still in active development.

IceApple uses an in-memory-only framework that highlights the adversary's priority of maintaining a low forensic footprint on the infected host. This is typical of long-running objectives aimed at intelligence collection and aligns with a targeted, state-sponsored mission. Though the observed targeted intrusions align with China-nexus, state-sponsored collection requirements, CrowdStrike Intelligence has not attributed IceApple to a named threat actor as of April 2022.

This paper explores how OverWatch made its discovery, detailing both the threat hunting workflows and tooling capabilities that helped uncover the exploitation framework and track its evolution.

Next, this paper examines how the IceApple framework is being used in the wild, providing a high-level summary of its capabilities. It then provides a deep dive on the unique modules and how they work.

The paper concludes with recommendations for defenders on mitigating risks to their IIS servers. The CrowdStrike Falcon® platform detects all currently known IceApple module loads, while OverWatch actively hunts new IceApple modules.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Internet Information Services (IIS) is Microsoft's extensible web server software. Its modular architecture enables developers to build components that extend or replace existing server functionality. IIS components can be either native dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) typically written in C++, or managed modules written in C#.

PERSISTENT IIS COMMAND EXECUTION

Adversaries are known to leverage two primary techniques for achieving persistence on compromised IIS servers: web shells¹ and malicious IIS components.² In OverWatch's

¹ For more information, see the MITRE ATT&CK® entry, Server Software Component: Web Shell, at: <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/>

² For more information, see the MITRE ATT&CK entry, Server Software Component: IIS Components, at: <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004/>

experience — regardless of which technique an adversary uses — the persistent component deployed possesses capabilities to load additional functionality to help an adversary achieve their objectives. These additional functionalities are usually loaded reflectively via precompiled .NET assemblies.³

.NET ASSEMBLIES

.NET assemblies form the cornerstone of Microsoft's .NET framework — a cross-platform software development framework. An assembly can function as either a standalone application in the form of an EXE file or as a library for use in other applications as a DLL. Applications can dynamically load .NET assemblies at runtime from the Global Assembly Cache (GAC),⁴ from the local filesystem or from a byte array containing the full contents of a compiled assembly.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THREAT HUNTERS

Because .NET assemblies can be a powerful and potentially stealthy way for adversaries to pursue their mission objectives, detections for reflective .NET assembly loads are actively being developed by OverWatch threat hunters. These detections successfully uncovered the IceApple post-exploitation framework being used in the wild.

HOW IS ICEAPPLE BEING USED?

OverWatch observed different IceApple modules being deployed in customer environments, which varied depending on how far the compromise of an environment had progressed.

When used shortly after an adversary gained initial access, IceApple was observed being rapidly deployed to multiple hosts to facilitate credential harvesting from local and remote host registries, credential logging on OWA servers, reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. OverWatch then observed adversaries returning to networks daily to continue their activity.

When used after an adversary had prolonged access to an environment, IceApple was observed being deployed to assist with credential harvesting and basic local reconnaissance. OverWatch observed adversaries in these instances returning every 10 to 14 days, likely as a means of ensuring access was maintained.

HOW DID OVERWATCH DISCOVER ICEAPPLE?

THE INITIAL TRIGGER

In late 2021, one of OverWatch's in-development detections for reflective .NET assembly loads was triggered on a customer's Microsoft Exchange OWA server. OverWatch initially detected four .NET assemblies being reflectively loaded into the "MSEExchangeOWAAppPool"

³ For more information, see the MITRE ATT&CK entry, Reflective Code Loading, at: <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/>

⁴ For more information on the Global Assembly Cache, see: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/app-domains/gac>

application pool on two Microsoft Exchange servers with the following names:

- App_Web_6nj14khm, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null
- App_Web_06y3iviz, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null
- App_Web_sbp810mc, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null
- App_Web_ic8e5fk4, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null

At first glance, these assemblies appear to be expected IIS temporary files generated as part of the process of converting Active Server Page Extended (ASPX) source files into .NET assemblies for IIS to load.

However, on closer analysis, OverWatch deemed the activity suspicious for three reasons:

1. IIS does not reflectively load its generated temporary .NET assemblies from byte arrays.
2. Microsoft Exchange does not reflectively load its .NET assemblies from byte arrays.
3. The last eight characters of IIS temporary file names are randomly generated; however, the same four .NET assembly names were seen on both hosts multiple times.




Figure 1. Temporary .NET assemblies generated by IIS and their randomly generated internal assembly's name

DIGGING DEEPER

OverWatch worked with the customer to turn on the **Script-Based Execution Monitoring** prevention policy setting to enable the CrowdStrike Falcon sensor to extract the content of reflectively loaded .NET assemblies across the customer's endpoints, increasing visibility.

After making these changes, OverWatch's reflectively loaded .NET assembly detection triggered again for the same four .NET assemblies (referenced above) being loaded on the original hosts. With **Script-Based Execution Monitoring** enabled, OverWatch was able to retrieve and analyze the contents of the .NET assemblies.

LEVERAGING THE POWER OF THE FALCON PLATFORM

An analyst is only as good as their tools. Before diving into the contents of the loaded assemblies, it is important to look at what the Falcon sensor captures in regard to reflectively loaded .NET assemblies and how OverWatch uses this information to provide its customers with up-to-date intelligence on in-progress compromises.

The Falcon sensor gives customers two key events for analyzing reflectively loaded .NET assemblies: `ReflectiveDotnetModuleLoad`, which provides the name of the .NET assembly loaded, and `ScriptControlScanTelemetry`,⁵ which provides the bytes of the .NET assembly loaded.

The `AssemblyName` field from the `ReflectiveDotnetModuleLoad` event is very useful for developing detections for common .NET tools that are downloaded from GitHub and then compiled and used in an attack without changing the assembly's name. For example, if two different adversaries download and compile Rubeus,⁶ the resulting DLL's hashes will be different; however, their assembly names will still be `Rubeus, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null`. Detections based on .NET assembly names, much like detections based on hashes, are very brittle, as with minimal effort `Rubeus, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null` can become `TotallyLegit, Version=1.3.3.7, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null` and bypass detection.

The `ScriptContentBytes` field from the `ScriptControlScanTelemetry` event contains the ASCII representation of the bytes being reflectively loaded. This ASCII string of hex data can be taken from Falcon Insight™ endpoint detection and response (EDR) and easily converted to the raw bytes of the .NET assembly, using open source tools like Cyber Chef.⁷ That converted data can then be loaded into a .NET decompiler, like dnSpy,⁸ and further analyzed.

The screenshot displays the Falcon Insight interface with two event logs. The first event, titled 'ReflectiveDotnetModuleLoad', occurred on 4/26/22 at 4:53:18.493 AM. It details the loading of a .NET assembly named 'App_Web_ic8e5fk4' (Version 0.0.0.0, Culture neutral, PublicKeyToken null) by the process 'w3wp.exe'. The event includes fields for 'AssemblyName', 'AssemblyId', 'DotnetModuleId', 'EffectiveTransmissionClass', 'Entitlements', 'FileName', 'FilePath', 'ImageFileName', 'ModuleILPath', 'event_platform', and 'event_simpleName'. The second event, titled 'ScriptControlScanTelemetry', occurred on 4/26/22 at 4:53:17.442 AM. It shows the script content bytes for the same process, including a command to run 'svchost.exe' with a specific command line. The event includes fields for 'CSAStatus', 'CallStackModuleNames', 'CommandLine', 'ComputerName', 'ContentSHA256HashData', 'FileName', 'FilePath', 'GrandparentImageFileName', 'ImageFileName', 'ParentCommandLine', 'ParentImageFileName', 'ScriptContentBytes', 'ScriptingLanguageId', 'event_platform', and 'event_simpleName'.

Figure 2. Falcon Insight showing the IceApple Loader module being loaded

5 ScriptControlScanTelemetry events will only be generated if "Script-Based Execution Monitoring" is enabled in the Falcon UI.

6 <https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus>

7 <https://github.com/gchq/CyberChef>

8 <https://github.com/dnSpy/dnSpy>

When developing detections for reflectively loaded .NET activity, OverWatch typically uses a combination of regular expressions on assembly names as well as the presence of a reflective .NET load occurring under an application or IIS application pool that does not typically perform this sort of operation. Analysis of `ScriptContentBytes` (payload bytes) is reserved for confirmation of maliciousness following the initial detection.

A CLOSER LOOK AT ICEAPPLE

Next, let's explore the 18 IceApple modules that OverWatch has observed to date. These modules support a wide range of capabilities, including:

- Listing directories
- Writing data to a file
- Deleting files and directories
- Retrieving the configuration of installed network adapters
- Making HTTP requests with the hard-coded user agent Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.4551; Pro)
- Retrieving IIS server variables
- Dumping credentials stored in registry keys on the infected host or a remote host
- Executing queries against Active Directory
- "Normal" exfiltrating of files
- Special exfiltration of files — including large files and several files at a time — via a separate HTTP listener
- Capturing OWA credentials




Figure 3. Tasking deserialization and processing flowchart

MODULE 1: APP_WEB_IC8E5FK4 — LOADER

Loader is the core of the IceApple framework and is the second most complex assembly detailed in this paper. OverWatch believes this assembly is loaded via a webshell, which reflectively loads *Loader* and calls its single function, `C()`. The `C()` function performs the remainder of the functionality in this assembly.

Loader has several processes that it undertakes for each request.

Initialization

Loader starts its execution by initializing several variables that are used in processing requests:

```
string keyName = "GlobalStore";
string prehooks = "PreHooks";
string typeName = "N.C";
string aesKey = "rmT4vFVeW2LL9SJ444XV7+a6ikcDSiZY1EJ/BuGB0xA=";
string validationString = "1I94yXWUzwRCbTdxP3LyLDjrP5efCzbQ";
```

Figure 4. Hard-coded values — the variable names have been modified to reflect their purpose

- **keyName**: The key name to use when storing and retrieving application-level variables
- **prehooks**: The key name for a secondary application-level storage location (OverWatch has not observed this value being used)
- **typeName**: The internal type name for all .NET assemblies to be reflectively loaded; this is used to prevent *Loader* from having to try and determine the assembly type information at runtime
- **aesKey**: A Base64-encoded AES key used to decrypt tasking
- **validationString**: Used to validate inbound parameter names

Next, *Loader* creates a key/value store containing all of the information needed by future modules. This key/value store, which OverWatch renamed to `config` in Figure 5, is the only parameter passed to any of the modules observed during our investigation.

```
Hashtable config = new Hashtable();
config.Add("GS", globalStore);
config.Add("PH", prehookList);
config.Add("HC", HttpContext.Current);
config.Add("RS", resultStore);
config.Add("ED", null);
config.Add("AB", null);
```

Figure 5. Creation of a key/value store for processing modules

The key/value store comprises:

- **GS**: Contains the global store, a key/value store for caching loaded modules for future use
- **PH**: Contains the prehooks key/value store
- **HC**: Contains the current HTTP context for this request, which can be used to retrieve a large amount of information about the request including header, parameters, cookies and request contents

- **RS** : Contains a list of byte arrays. All uses of this value suggest that modules use RS as a result store for their output. As such, RS will be referred to as the result store. The result store is cleared at the beginning of each request, meaning any results not retrieved at the end of the previous request will be lost.
- **ED** : The purpose of this value is unknown.
- **AB** : This value is populated with the decrypted parameters for a module prior to it being called.

Extract and Decrypt Tasking

Loader loops over all parameters and performs several checks on their values, including verifying that the value is longer than five characters and that the first five characters exist in the `validationString` variable discussed in the initialization section above. The value of all parameters that meet these criteria are appended together before moving onto the next step.

```
// Storage for encoded parameter pieces
string encodedParams = "";

// Extract all parameters
string[] paramNames = HttpContext.Current.Request.Params.AllKeys;
// Sort parameters alphabetically
Array.Sort<string>(paramNames);
// Iterate over all parameters
foreach (string paramName in paramNames) {
    // Extract current parameter's value
    string paramValue = HttpContext.Current.Request.Params.Get(paramName);
    // Values with a length of 5 or less are skipped
    if (paramValue.Length > 5) {
        // Extract the first 5 characters of the parameters value
        string value = paramValue.Substring(0, 5);
        // Check if the extracted characters are present in validationString
        if (text.IndexOf(value) >= 0) {
            // If they are, append the remainder of the parameter value to
            encodedParams
            encodedParams += paramValue.Substring(5);
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 6. Documented parameter extraction code

With the values of all parameters processed, *Loader* Base64-decodes then AES-decrypts (using the previously mentioned hard-coded AES key and the first 16 bytes of the Base64-decoded value as an initialization vector [IV]). Next, *Loader* Gzip-decompresses the extracted parameters. This process results in a value that contains all tasking and parameters serialized with a custom algorithm, discussed next.

DEFENSE EVASION

Performing parameter extraction this way means the adversary doesn't require a password parameter like conventional CHOPPER-style webshells do. This means that all parameter names can be random or chosen to blend in with the target application.






Figure 7. Parameter extraction and processing flowchart

Deserialization and Execution

The final stages that *Loader* completes are deserialization and execution of the serialized tasking. The serialized value can (and generally does) contain multiple tasks.

The serialization method used appears to be custom — albeit basic — and consists of a repeated pattern of 4 bytes containing the length in bytes of the proceeding value. For example, the following shows how the value “OverWatch” would be serialized:

```

09 00 00 00 4F 76 65 72 57 61 74 63 68
|--Size---| |-----OverWatch-----|

```

Figure 8. Example serialization of the value “OverWatch”

Using this method, *Loader* deserializes tasks with the following format:

```

{
  keyName
  tag
  assemblyBytes
  assemblyParams
} Task

```

Figure 9. Task format

- `keyName` and `tag` are joined to form a unique key, which is used to cache loaded assemblies for additional requests.
- `assemblyBytes` contains raw bytes to be reflectively loaded via `Assembly.Load()`.
- `assemblyParams` contains a byte array, which is stored in the `AB` value of the `config` key/value store. This value contains the parameters for the module being loaded and could contain anything from a string to a byte array. Extracting of parameters from this value is performed by each module.

After deserializing a task, *Loader* uses the values `keyName` and `tag` to see if the module needed for this task is already loaded and stored in the `GlobalStore`.

If the assembly is not found, then *Loader* reflectively loads the raw bytes from `assemblyBytes` in the task and stores the resulting assembly in the `GlobalStore` for future use. Regardless of whether the assembly was found in the `GlobalStore` or newly loaded, *Loader* then executes the `Equals ( )` method of the target assembly, passing `config` as a parameter.

Once a task has been processed, *Loader* proceeds to deserialize and execute the next task until all tasks are complete.

It is worth noting that the only time *Loader* will produce an output is if an exception is thrown outside of a task. All outputs from tasks are processed and returned by the `App_Web_paeld9n9 Result Retriever` module detailed in the Module 2 section.

UNDERSTANDING THE MODULE STRUCTURE

Before discussing the rest of the modules observed by *OverWatch*, it is helpful to understand the structure and initialization common to all modules.

```
namespace N
{
    internal class C
    {
        public override bool Equals(object obj)
        {
            Hashtable hashtable = obj as Hashtable;
            List<byte[]> list = hashtable["RS"] as List<byte[]>;
            byte[] bytes = hashtable["AB"] as byte[];
            string @string = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(bytes);
            string[] array = @string.Split(new char[]{'|'});
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 10. An example of a module's initialization

All modules observed consist of a class named `C` under a namespace of `N`; however, the `typeName` field discussed in the *Loader* module suggests this could be easily changed.

Each module overrides the `Equals` function of the `Object` class, with `Object` being the base .NET class all other classes are derived from. The `Equals` function takes a single parameter of type `Object` (effectively allowing any value which subclasses `Object` to be passed in).

The use of the `Equals` function to execute code within a reflectively loaded .NET assembly is novel and allows *Loader* to call this function within any module without having to know anything about the structure of the module, its internal functions or what parameters it takes.⁹

⁹ For more information, see the relevant documentation at:
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.object.equals>

The passed-in parameter of type `Object` is first cast to a `Hashtable` to recover the `config key/value store` described above. Next, the value of `RS` (or the result store) is extracted from `config` and converted to a `List` of byte arrays. The result store may already contain results from a previously executed task.

The value of `AB` is extracted from `config` as a byte array. As mentioned, `AB` contains the parameters for the current module and may have a different meaning for each module. In this example, `AB` represents a UTF-8 encoded string that is delimited with a pipe (`|`) character.

MODULE 2: APP_WEB_PAELD9N9 — RESULT RETRIEVER

The *Result Retriever* module is responsible for the serialization, compression, encryption and transmission of the results of all other modules.

Results are serialized using the method described in *Loader* before being Gzip-compressed, AES-encrypted and Base64-encoded. Results are then sent as a response to the original tasking request, which suggests that *Result Retriever* is called as the final task for each series of requests. Results are returned via one of three methods based on the amount of data being returned.

Methods

Method 1 — Cookie: Response data is sent as the value for a custom cookie, the name of which is controlled by the adversary.

Method 2 — Header: Response data is sent as the value for a custom header, the name of which is controlled by the adversary.

Method 3 — Body: Response data is sent in the body of the request, wrapped in an adversary-specified template.

Parameters

Result Retriever accepts a pipe-delimited string that is split into an array where each field has the following purpose:

Index	Purpose
0	Base64-encoded AES key
1	HTTP response code to send with response
2	A URL to redirect to if the HTTP response code is 3xx
3	The maximum response size supported by Response Method 1
4	The name of the cookie to send the response in for Response Method 1
5	The maximum response size supported by Response Method 2
6	The name of the header to send the response in for Response Method 2
7	The body of the response to send when using Response Method 1 or 2
8	The body of the response to send when using Response Method 3; must contain the value <code>"{{{DATA}}}"</code> , which will be replaced with the encoded response data to return
9	A value to be prepended to the Base64-encoded results for all response methods
10	A value to be appended to the Base64-encoded results for all response methods

MODULE 3: APP_WEB_06Y3IVIZ — A PREVIOUS VERSION OF MODULE 2

OverWatch observed a previous version of the *Result Retriever* module with the assembly name `App_Web_06y3iviz`, which used hard-coded values rather than accepting the above parameters.

Of note, Method 1 responses were sent via a cookie named `X-BackEndCookies` with the value `As7` prepended to the value returned. In addition, the status code is always 302 with a redirect header to the OWA login page. Method 2 is not present in the previous version. Method 3 embeds the response in a fake stack trace and redirects to the OWA error page.

```
if (text.Length < 20480)
{
    HttpRequest request = HttpContext.Current.Request;
    response.Cookies["X-BackEndCookies"].Value = "As7" + text;
    string text2 = string.Concat(new string[]
    {
        "https://",
        request.Url.Host,
        "/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=",
        Uri.EscapeDataString(request.Url.ToString()),
        "&reason=0"
    });
    string s = "<html><head><title>Object
moved</title></head><body>\r\n<h2>Object moved to <a href=\"" +
text2 + "\">here</a>.</h2>\r\n</body></html>";
    response.StatusCode = 302;
    response.RedirectLocation = text2;
    response.Clear();
    response.Write(s);
}
else
{
    response.StatusCode = 302;
    response.RedirectLocation =
"/owa/auth/errorFE.aspx?httpCode=500";
    response.Clear();
    response.Write("<!--\r\nStack Trace:\r\nFzM" + text + "\r\n-->");
}
```

Figure 11. Previous version of *Result Retriever*

MODULE 4: APP_WEB_YBRA1DR2 — DIRECTORY LISTER

The *Directory Lister* module lists information about a list of files and directories including:

- Creation time
- Last write time
- Name
- Size

Directory Lister differs from other IceApple modules in that it performs parameter extraction in the `Equals` function before calling a second function named `Run`, which contains the module's functionality.

Parameters

Accepts a pipe-delimited list of files and directories to list.

MODULE 5: APP_WEB_8MYTEDC8 — ANOTHER VERSION OF MODULE 4

OverWatch observed an older version of *Directory Lister* with the assembly name `App_web_8mytedc8` that uses the `Equals` function for both parameter extraction and module functionality. `App_web_8mytedc8` is functionally identical to *Directory Lister*.

MODULE 6: APP_WEB_HP8VZZB4 — FILE WRITER

The *File Writer* module writes a byte array to a file.

Parameters

The passed-in parameter contains a serialized filename followed by raw bytes to be written to the target file.

Index	Purpose
0	Filename
1	Bytes to write

MODULE 7: APP_WEB_CFZLQTLR — FILE AND DIRECTORY DELETER

The *File and Directory Deleter* module deletes files and folders.

Parameters

A pipe-delimited string of paths to delete.

MODULE 8: APP_WEB_67VHAQFF — IFCONFIG

The *ifconfig* module iterates over all network interfaces on the host and retrieves the following information:

- Name
- Description

- MAC address
- DNS suffix
- DNS servers
- Gateways
- IPv4 addresses
- Subnet masks

MODULE 9: APP_WEB_S8X7GRB2 — HTTP GET

HTTP Get (internally named `httpget` based on error strings) allows the adversary to make basic HTTP requests with no custom parameters or headers except for the hard-coded User Agent value of `Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.4551; Pro)`. After completing a request, *HTTP Get* pulls information such as the response code, response headers and response content, and reconstructs the response as a string suitable for retrieval by the adversary.

Parameters

A single UTF8-encoded string containing the URL to request.

MODULE 10: APP_WEB_F46V50KG — SERVER VARIABLE DUMPER

The *Server Variable Dumper* module iterates over all server variables present for the current request and returns them to the adversary.

MODULE 11: APP_WEB_6NJ14KHM — CREDENTIAL DUMPER

The *Credential Dumper* module allows the adversary to dump the contents of registry keys that contain encrypted credentials, as well as the keying material required to decrypt them. These keys can be dumped from a local or remote host.

The following keys contain encrypted password hashes as well as the keying material needed to calculate the bootkey (i.e., decryption key) needed to decrypt these password hashes:

```
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\JD
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Skew1
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\GBG
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Data
HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\F
HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\*\V
HKLM\SECURITY\Cache\*
```

The following keys are associated with Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets:

```
HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\PolEKList\default
HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\*\CurrVal
HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\*\OldVal
```

The type of keys dumped are controlled by parameters 1-N.

Parameters

Credential Dumper accepts a pipe-delimited string that is split into an array where each field has the following purpose:

Index	Purpose
0	Host to dump (localhost or a remote host name)
1-N	Strings from the following set: "secrets", "cache", "samaccount"

MODULE 12: APP_WEB_AI57ZS2M — ANOTHER VERSION OF MODULE 11

OverWatch observed another version of *Credential Dumper* with the assembly name `App_Web_ai57zs2m` that has minor differences. `App_Web_ai57zs2m` does not include an `Equals` function, instead placing the logic in the assemblies' constructor. While this assembly would still work with *Loader*, it could not be recalled from the Global Store as its `Equals` function has not been overwritten.

This version of the assembly also does not utilize the result retrieval method of other payloads observed in this framework. Instead, results are Base64-encoded and wrapped in "junk" (unused) JavaScript and written to four locations under the Microsoft Exchange install location:

- `\ClientAccess\Owa\auth\addrbook.cs`
- `\ClientAccess\Owa\auth\addrbook.js`
- `\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\scripts\premium\addrbook.cs`
- `\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\scripts\premium\addrbook.js`

MODULE 13: APP_WEB_SBP8LOMC — ACTIVE DIRECTORY QUERIER

The *Active Directory Querier* module provides an interface for an adversary to perform authenticated requests against an Active Directory server.

Parameters

Active Directory Querier accepts a byte array containing several strings serialized using the previously described method. The order and purpose of the serialized strings is set out below:

Index	Purpose
0	The Active Directory directory to open
1	Username
2	Password
3	Authentication type ¹⁰
4	Search filter
5	Search scope ¹¹
6	A pipe-delimited list of properties to return

¹⁰ For more information, see the relevant documentation at: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.authenticationtypes>

¹¹ For more information, see the relevant documentation at: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.searchscope>

MODULE 14: APP_WEB_ZM5IVGUM — QUERY2FILE

The *query2file* module is another version of *Active Directory Querier*, which is functionally the same as Module 13; however, *query2file* appears to have been slightly reworked to support long-running queries.

When called, *query2file* creates a string called `threadControlEnvPrefix` with the format `LDAP_QUERY2FILE_{0}_` where `{0}` is replaced with the current time in UTC, formatted with the string `yyMMddHHmmss`. `threadControlEnvPrefix` is prepended to several environment variables used to control and check the status of running searches.

query2file starts a new thread that performs all other actions while the main thread returns the managed thread ID and the value of `threadControlEnvPrefix` via the previously discussed result retrieval means.

In addition to the seven parameters described, *query2file* accepts a file path to output results, which can be either a regular file path or a special path beginning with `memfs://`, the use of which will cause results to be stored in a `memfs` entry in the Global Store.

MODULE 15: APP_WEB_NITM6AXL — FILE EXFILTRATOR

The *File Exfiltrator* module allows for a single file to be exfiltrated from the target host. The output of this module consists of the target host's hostname and the target file's contents, serialized using the previously discussed method.

Parameters

A single UTF8-encoded string containing the path of the file to exfiltrate.

MODULE 16: APP_WEB_UGRFVUDI — MULTI FILE EXFILTRATOR

The *Multi File Exfiltrator* module allows for multiple files to be encrypted, compressed and exfiltrated. This module functions slightly differently than other modules. When run, *Multi File Exfiltrator* creates a `HttpListener`, which allows it to handle requests to URLs matching an adversary-specified pattern on the target server. All other usage of this module is triggered via requests to this listener.

When a new request is received, the registered handler first checks if the requested URL ends with `/stop`. If it does, *Multi File Exfiltrator* stops the `HttpListener`, preventing further handling of requests.

Next, the module extracts all headers, request parameters and key value pairs defined in the request input. It sorts them alphabetically based on their key and identifies "valid" parameters by looking for the presence of the first five characters of each key's associated value in the hardcoded string `KAJdPY30h1e7jSKpcDUiVBkZiGUAH3zL`, much like *Loader's* parameter validation method.

These parameters are concatenated, Base64-decoded, Gzip-decompressed and deserialized to recover the name of the file to exfiltrate. Finally, the contents of the target file are read, XOR'ed with the key `3hu5njdushydf7^ATSD&y3gbhyrbgyusag% ^A&Dt`, Gzip-compressed and written back as an HTTP response.

MODULE 17: APP_WEB_XW4CRB70 — IIS MODULE LISTER

IIS Module Lister and *OWA Credential Logger* (see Module 18 below) have always been observed together. OverWatch suspects that *IIS Module Lister* is used to dump some values needed to load *OWA Credential Logger* and to verify that *OWA Credential Logger* successfully registered an event handler, which is described below.

IIS Module Lister uses reflection to gain access to several internal fields within the “System.Web” assembly, through which it can extract the details of all registered IIS modules, including the events within the IIS request processing pipeline they are registered to receive callbacks for.



```

Name: Session
Type: System.Web.SessionState.SessionStateModule
Precondition: managedHandler


Name: WindowsAuthentication
Type: System.Web.Security.WindowsAuthenticationModule
Precondition: managedHandler

Name: FormsAuthentication
Type: System.Web.Security.FormsAuthenticationModule
Precondition: managedHandler

_moduleContainers[4] # Session
  _moduleSteps[5] # AcquireRequestState
    step0
  _moduleSteps[8] # ReleaseRequestState
    step0
  _moduleSteps[11] # EndRequest
    step0
_moduleContainers[6] # DefaultAuthentication
  _modulePostSteps[1] # AuthenticateRequest
    step0
  
```

Figure 12. An example of IIS Module Lister's output

Finally, three numbers are output, which OverWatch believes are the three numbers *OWA Credential Logger* takes as its parameters.



```

## first moduleStep
firstModuleContainerIndex: 10
firstModuleStepIndex: 0
firstModuleStepDefaultSize: 1
  
```

Figure 13. An example of the three numbers returned by IIS Module Lister

MODULE 18: APP_WEB_30QT6248 — OWA CREDENTIAL LOGGER

The *OWA Credential Logger* module shows the depth of this adversary's knowledge of IIS and is the most complex IceApple module observed by OverWatch to date. Its purpose is to look for and log OWA credentials.

This module monitors for request handlers that are waiting to be used and preemptively injects an event handler into them. This allows the adversary to run some code whenever a request is accepted. When a request is received, *OWA Credential Logger* checks to see if it is an OWA

READER NOTE

It is important to note that all of the fields discussed in this section are internal to Microsoft .NET assemblies and are not intended to be used by third-party developers. Therefore, there is no documentation of these fields' purpose.

OverWatch has inferred the purpose of the fields discussed in this section based on the context in which they are used and the result achieved by the adversary; however, OverWatch cannot comment on Microsoft's intended use of these fields.

The detailed description that follows requires a sound understanding of C# coding terminology.



authentication request and if so, logs the credentials.

When run, *OWA Credential Logger* starts a new processing thread before returning a success message. The processing thread initially uses reflection to acquire two key references from `System.Web.HttpApplicationFactory`:

- `_theApplicationFactory`: A static variable used to hold the instance of `HttpApplicationFactory`, which manages the creation and deletion of all `HttpApplication` objects needed to handle requests under this IIS worker instance
- `_freeList`: A collection of `HttpApplication` objects that have been recycled and are ready for reuse

With the references acquired, the processing thread starts a loop that executes every three seconds as long as the environment variable `MODULESTEPS_OWALOGIN_THREAD_STOP` does not exist. On each iteration of the loop, the *HttpApplication* values in `_freeList` are iterated over, and for each one, a new `EventHandler` is inserted for the adversary's desired event if one is not already present.¹²

Whenever the registered event handler fires, it checks that:

- The requested path is `/owa/auth.owa`.
- The `username` field is set.
- The `password` field is set.

If the three conditions above are met, then the values of `username` and `password` are written to `C:\Windows\Temp\TS_MSOL1.tmp`.

Parameters

OWA Credential Logger accepts a pipe-delimited string consisting of three numbers where each number is used as an offset into an array acquired through reflection to determine if an event handler should be added.

¹² For more information, see the relevant documentation at:
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.web.httpapplication#remarks>

TIMELINE

The following timeline shows the build timestamps for each of the 18 modules discussed in this paper. This shows the progression of the IceApple framework over the past year and suggests that IceApple remains under active development.




Figure 14. Timeline of IceApple module development

THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD DEFENSE

At its core, IceApple is a post-exploitation framework focused on increasing an adversary's visibility of a target through acquisition of credentials and exfiltration of data. None of the modules observed by OverWatch provides exploitation or lateral movement capabilities. As such, the best defense is to protect web applications from malicious access through sound processes to maintain good baseline security, effective technology to prevent known threats, and proactive human-led hunting to identify unknown and emerging threats.

OverWatch has only observed IceApple being loaded into application pools associated with Microsoft Exchange; however, it is capable of running under any IIS web application. Therefore, ensuring all web applications are regularly and fully patched is critical to preventing IceApple from ending up in your environment. Technology is also an important part of the equation, and the Falcon platform detects all currently known IceApple module loads.

Finally, threat hunting is a crucial piece of the defensive puzzle when it comes to novel and stealthy adversary tools like IceApple. Hunters draw on their extensive experience of what "normal" looks like in enterprise environments, knowledge of adversary behavior, and up-to-the-minute threat intelligence to preempt possible threats. This feeds the development and testing of hypotheses that enhance the hunt and curtail adversary attempts to evade technology-based defenses.

CONCLUSION

IceApple is a highly sophisticated IIS post-exploitation framework — however, it is by no means the only one. OverWatch regularly identifies new reflectively loaded .NET assemblies of various levels of sophistication, ranging from basic wrappers around Windows utilities such as WMI to highly modularized and well-engineered frameworks with multiple levels of encryption protecting data in transit and between modules. While many of the assemblies observed by OverWatch are only seen in a customer's environment once and then never again, a few — such as IceApple — continue to be reused on target networks while showing signs that they are in active development.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

SHA256	Assembly Name	Module
3514c8f0b6992a4b3746d874013789b8bd3e9ff4a44f00f5d076320e6a403136	App_Web_ic8e5fk4, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 1: Loader
b6379b98f0993c652fd0c5907395123cfb14fa30818d3153b7655def8329c4c1	App_Web_paeld9n9, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 2: Result Retriever
517d08ffdb2889e11a86b7a011de385dc43623f80f6fdf43e55b683c08206228	App_Web_06y3iviz, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 3: Result Retriever Variant
3e72696d5618f013cd8fd686c11f9778ac55ce1ca61f5dd6c5b86b917495bde2	App_Web_8mytedc8, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 4: Directory Lister
cf9b151e116ee1429d2fcd3553c90d98a73a4d769f976759e60d8113a7d8229c	App_Web_ybra1dr2, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 5: Directory Lister Variant
648592597b561c775feb8909148b91bd2e8452ab3b2c1e98ead2c4f9caf2e3ff	App_Web_hp8vzzb4, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 6: File Writer
131c7d2ec3c7dba738466a586aca4bd80af540832b1243ace184918db65ee7e5	App_Web_cfzqltqr, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 7: File and Directory Deleter
075a8456f3d74da6f830bcae39990f43e4aef63c0a69ea2f5a5e1eb8ba51b51e	App_Web_67vhaqff, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 8: ifconfig
e199faf72661b7e822da2d02aec59227a2d413d02bd288a3b26e5465d59fda5b	App_Web_s8x7grb2, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 9: HTTP Get
c5ff6b1b201d6289ab718575d0175b322653b3fe92c4ba046fc6e785f83404ed	App_Web_f46v5okg, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 10: Server Variable Dumper
29fe8f7cdeb8b2a4c0d9e7410cd4cbe1873a22eada4a592b9df6f2ee6c335ff9	App_Web_6nj14khm, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 11: Credential Dumper
189dfd287b0ff6b5161a89343fcde57f509dfa99f44277ad6cfb9ccbdffbf436a	App_Web_ai57zs2m, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 12: Credential Dumper Variant
9c36f62e2f347e709223f38450f8fcd075b-273f164219e6fc6db112fdb26db4d	App_Web_sbp8l0mc, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 13: Active Directory Querier
2e45ad3689e9b13d40880b142925a4922e77c-769c9f2809e702d6a4f5485384a	App_Web_zm5ivgum, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 14: query2file
91505feb5369978eeecba4c92a07f0aaddbddd238e-da207dd08e81a6839750e6	App_Web_nitm6axl, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 15: File Exfiltrator
16cc7ab162aacb38cd0dbf3ad9a9ba836649e3fb7afdb-189c6d529dd0d9a2bc6	App_Web_ugrfvudi, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 16: Multi File Exfiltrator
1629c7a876fb7c63a49a9d182d0c4b993cc3e-91d4e6c9a2d207a94c2ac810cdd	App_Web_xw4crb70, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 17: IIS Module Lister
818e045ad6d365a2560cae35f6cf04e0713586bdf6f6-341c2ac19539e58c665	App_Web_3oqt6248, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null	Module 18: OWA Credential Logger

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